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‘Fertility, social class, gender and the professional model: statistical explanation and 
historical significance’ 1 
 
Abstract: 
In 2012 Barnes and Guinnane published a revised statistical analysis of the critical evaluation 
of the official 1911 social class model of fertility decline that was presented in chapter 6 of 
Szreter’s Fertility Class and Gender in Britain, 1860-1940 (FCG). They argue that the 
official model of five ranked social classes is, after all, a satisfactory statistical summary of 
the fertility variance found among the married couples of England and Wales at the famous 
1911 fertility census and so they conclude that, pace Szreter, the official model provides a 
satisfactory account of the nation’s fertility decline as one of social class differentials. It is 
acknowledged here that B&G have deployed superior statistical techniques. But it is pointed-
out that FCG identified far more fundamental problems with the design of the 1911 official 
model. It was a social evolutionary model privileging male professional occupations, not a 
modelling of recognised social class theory at the time or since. In FCG it was therefore 
termed ‘the professional model’. The central historiographical claim of Fertility, Class and 
Gender is re-affirmed: that in order to study fruitfully and to further elucidate the complex 
historical relationship between social class and the fertility decline among married couples in 
England and Wales, an alternative approach to that of the professional model of fertility 
variation is needed, one which explicitly integrates gender relations with social class.      
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I am grateful to Geoffrey Barnes and Tim Guinnane (B&G) for the efforts they have made to 
revisit and revise the statistical analysis presented in chapter 6 of Fertility, Class and Gender 
(FCG).
 2
  FCG was a historical study of the secular fertility decline among the married 
couples of England and Wales with radical historiographical implications. It commenced in 
chapters 2-5 with a critical examination of the previously untouched intellectual history of the 
Registrar-General’s official model of social class. This was because, as chapter 1 
demonstrated, this model exerted enormous, unchallenged historiographic influence, accepted 
as a starting point for all study of the subject since it was first devised by the original analyst 
of the occupational fertility data collected at the 1911 census, Dr T.H.C. Stevenson, the 
Superintendent of Statistics at the General Register Office of England and Wales (GRO), 
1909-31.
 The excavation of the model’s intellectual history in Part II (chapters 2-5) exposed 
major conceptual and methodological problems. B&G do not engage with the implications of 
these aspects of the critique of the model and instead focus exclusively on a statistical 
exercise conducted in Ch.6 of FCG.  
 
In chapter 6 of FCG an attempt was made to evaluate statistically how well the five status-
ranked classes of Stevenson’s original version of the model summarised the variance in the 
published average fertility values available for 176 male occupational unit groups. The main 
purpose of this exercise was to evaluate whether one possible reason for the model’s 
historiographical longevity could have been that, despite all its problematic design features, it 
nevertheless offered an apparently compelling summary of the demographic data. The 
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Registrar-General in fact distinguished as many as 465 male occupations at the 1911 census- 
from among which the five socially ranked classes had been composed. These 176, analysed 
in chapter 6, were a selection for which Stevenson had also published their individual data- 
mostly those with the largest number of couples. My conclusions in chapter 6 were that since 
the model appeared to ‘explain’ only about half of the variance in the fertility of the married 
couples in these 176 occupations, this was hardly a compelling case to justify its decades of 
dominance; and that this only reinforced the conclusions drawn from chapters 1-5 that an 
alternative approach to all the variation evident in the occupational fertility patterns, 
abandoning the official model, would be a productive way forward (which then occupied 
chapters 7-10 of FCG).   
 
B&G have now deployed a superior technique of statistical analysis to that used in ch.6, 
ANOVA, to re-analyse this variance. They find that Stevenson’s five-category model 
statistically explains 67% of the variance among  the 176 component occupational units; and 
they provide a kernel density diagram (B&G, Figure 3), which graphically summarises the 
distribution of the averaged fertility values for these 176 occupations, sorted into the five 
graded classes. Further, it might be added that the mean value of each of these classes is 
statistically significantly different from each other and ranks in the order described by the 
official model, with the exception of Classes III and IV, which B&G acknowledge to be 
statistically indistinguishable. I do not dispute any of this. Chapter 6 acknowledged the rank 
order of the classes, while also pointing out that the central range of the picture was very 
blurred.
3
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If FCG had only been a study of how much the five graded social classes of Stevenson’s 
model summarised the variance in the 176 occupations, B&G’s critical comment would be a 
justified corrective. However, ch.6 was only one part of a much wider study of the fertility 
decline in the population of England and Wales, presented in the 10 chapters of FCG. The 
statistical exercise offered in ch.6 was never published as a free-standing article but only in 
FCG in sequence following chapters 2-5. This is because those prior chapters are necessary 
for readers to comprehend that there are a number of crucial methodological problems with 
Stevenson’s model. B&G’s critical comment does not take into account the implications of 
all this research and is presented as a text-book exercise in ANOVA, with the statistical 
results treated unproblematically as having direct, substantive and historiographic 
implications for our understanding of the fertility decline. I do not think this is a tenable 
position, nor an intellectually fruitful one for the future study of the fertility decline.    
 
I was pre-eminently concerned in Parts I and II of FCG with exposing the unwarranted 
historiographic dominance of the official classification scheme as a model of social class, 
given its conceptual and design weaknesses. I was interested in Parts III and IV to show how 
a radically alternative approach could be developed and used to explore dimensions of 
variation in male occupations’ fertility and nuptiality that could not be accounted for by the 
official model. In short, I disagree with Barnes and Guinnane over R
2 
: not so much its size or 
statistical significance, but its historical meaning in this case and, therefore, its substantive, 
historical significance. I defer to their point that social scientists do generally judge an R
2
 of 
this magnitude (0.67) to be large and meaningful; but social scientists would also agree such 
a result is only reliably interpretable if we have confidence that the underlying model has 
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theoretical validity and that the model’s design is also satisfactory.  We can perhaps move the 
debate forward therefore by asking: is the model robust? Is it optimal? Are its theoretical 
underpinnings intellectually rigorous? Is its design satisfactory? What can we actually learn 
from it? What is its intellectual opportunity cost? What does its singular emphasis on a linear 
gradient of supposed male occupational status fail to tell us; or even obscure from us? First, 
therefore, I will present a short summary of the critique that I presented in FCG of these 
aspects of the classification system used in the professional model to identify my chief 
concerns in this respect. 
 
I 
 
As the historiographical introductory chapter to FCG showed, the professional model of 
society was an official classification system for male occupations into five ranked social 
grades developed by Dr THC Stevenson between 1910 and 1927 from an original hybrid 8-
class model. It subsequently provided, throughout the twentieth century, an unquestioned 
orthodoxy about the social morphology of the historic fertility decline in England and Wales. 
It had apparently found that ‘the upper and middle class’, Class I, had led the way towards 
lower fertility. They were followed by the skilled working class, Class III, while those with 
unskilled occupations, Class V, brought up the rear. In the 1920s Stevenson himself proposed 
a theory of ‘diffusion’ of novel behaviour down the nation’s status hierarchy to account for 
the pattern he had found.
4
 The model had five, not three ordinal grades, because each of these 
three defined classes was separated by an ‘intermediate’ class containing occupations of a 
less determinate character judged to be of a social standing somewhere between those placed 
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in the three core classes. These intermediate classes enabled the model apparently to apply to 
the whole population, rather than only the sections selected for the three named classes.  
 
It is hard to exaggerate just how dominant this model was in demography, sociology, social 
policy, public health and epidemiology, both in Britain and internationally in the Anglophone 
world. It was still in 1996, when FCG was published, the official model of social structure in 
England and Wales, essentially unaltered.
 5
 There was even a popular, derivative scheme in 
wide commercial use.
6
  In the interwar decades its popularity had spread internationally, with 
Stevenson’s findings of a linear, graded pattern of ‘class-differential’ fertility promoted by 
leading figures in both Britain (W.H. Beveridge and A.M. Carr-Saunders) and USA (Warren 
Thompson, F.W. Notestein).
7
 Indeed, such was the cachet of the model that during the 1930s 
the US Census Bureau created an official model in direct emulation of the British one to 
measure change in US fertility differentials.
8
 The officials of many other countries also joined 
in the international comparative project of measuring ‘differential fertility’, creating similar, 
linear, socially-graded classification systems.
9
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The model was beguilingly powerful, apparently offering only a single, linear dimension of 
social differentiation to explain observed variation found in demographic and other 
phenomena. However, as the introductory chapter of FCG argued, this was also intellectually 
limiting, even stultifying. Over many decades of study, competing explanations of fertility 
decline tended to remain correspondingly uni-dimensional, such as diffusion (Stevenson’s 
and Beveridge’s proposed explanation)  or democratisation (proposed by the American, 
Norman Himes, in 1936 in his encyclopaedic Medical History of Contraception) with little 
way of adjudicating empirically between them. This could lead, on the one hand, to a sterile 
standoff between mono-causal alternatives, each apparently consistent with the evidence of a 
linear social grading: economics versus culture; innovation versus diffusion; or simply to the 
abdication of judgement with indiscriminate lists concluding that almost everything was 
potentially important, such as that issuing from the influential Royal Commission on 
Population of 1944-49.
10
  
 
The solution to this impasse offered by FCG was to commence by asking a typical historian’s 
question: where has this official model come from? Or, in other words, why is the evidence 
classified and presented in this particular way?  Part II of FCG, chapters 2-5, presented a 
fully-documented intellectual history of the genesis of the official ‘social class’ model. This 
demonstrated a number of important properties of the model, which should be of primary 
methodological concern to any historian or social scientist today studying the fertility decline 
and interested in the relationship between the fertility of the population’s married couples, 
male occupations and social class.  
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First, it was shown that this ‘social class’ model was designed without reference to the 
recognised corpus of sociological  theory of social class or stratification derived from the 
seminal works of Marx, Durkheim, Weber and their critics. Instead the classification 
principles used for aggregating groups of male occupations, which formed the five graded 
classes, were derived from a defunct social evolutionist consensus among the late Victorian 
and Edwardian British educated elite. This envisaged that male occupations could be linearly 
socially graded according, firstly, to the degree of presumed intelligence required for their 
performance; and, secondly, the degree of manual skill.
11
 In view of this finding, and in order 
to avoid unhelpful confusion with the important body of theoretical, empirical and 
sociological work on social class relations in modern British history and historiography, FCG 
referred to Stevenson’s official classification scheme as ‘the professional model’ of society, 
signalling the fact that it was not a model derived from recognised social class theory and that 
most of the occupations collected in its highest status category, Social Class I, comprised the 
male liberal professions.   
   
A second, related methodological concern exposed by FCG was the underlying occupational 
taxonomy of the professional model, which formed the fundamental social units from which 
the five classes were formed. This was not designed for the purpose of constructing a social 
classification scheme. It was a pre-existing, pragmatic compromise inherited by Stevenson, 
which reflected two other nineteenth-century historical influences. Firstly, a strong and long-
standing historical interest on the part of the GRO, almost since its foundation in 1837, in the 
medical and disease implications of work of different kinds. This had resulted in a 
consequent need to harmonise occupational information collected at the census with lower 
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quality data collected at death registration under different statutory powers.
12
 A second 
influence was the interest of economists and the Treasury in using occupational information 
for measuring economic functions and employment in different industries.
13
 This inherited, 
hybrid occupational taxonomy, though undoubtedly presenting much interesting information 
about a diversely-defined range of occupations, consequently had a number of deeply 
problematic design features if it was to be used as the foundation for a putative model of 
social classes in Britain. Probably the most unsatisfactory feature, on theoretical grounds in 
relation to social class, was the fact that employers, employees and the self-employed were 
all amalgamated together in many occupations (in as many as 110 of the 195 studied in 
FCG). Of equivalent concern for issues of basic statistical comparability was the fact that 
there were extremely large divergences in the demographic sizes of the 465 different male 
occupations distinguished in the official taxonomy at the 1911 census.
 
Over 250 of the 
smaller occupational categories were consequently omitted from the official publication, 
which gave the tabulated fertility characteristics for each of the remaining 200 or so 
occupations, the source for the occupational analysis presented in FCG and by B&G.
14
 By 
contrast, for instance, just four of the approximately 200 occupations for which fertility 
information was officially published and which were analysed in FCG, jointly represented a 
larger proportion of the married male workforce than all these 250 omitted occupations, 
combined.
15
  Even among the remaining 200 or so tabulated occupations used in FCG, 
several individual occupations were sixty or seventy times larger than many of the other 
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tabulated occupations in terms of the number of married couples they represented; and in one 
case 130 times greater.
16
   
 
Thirdly, it was shown in Ch.5 of FCG that in fact the original version of the model, as 
applied to the 1911 census fertility data, was not a unitary scheme of five ranked classes 
summarising the whole population, but a hybrid of 8 classes. The model’s architect, Dr 
Stevenson, knew that the fertility and infant mortality patterns of quantitatively large and 
highly socially significant sections among the working classes failed to conform to the linear 
social grading pattern he intended to depict with the new official class model. Textile workers 
were known to have unusually low fertility while coal-miners, the high-paid elite of the 
working-class, were known to have extremely high fertility. Stevenson’s solution to these 
troublesome ‘anomalies’, was to remove workers in these two large sectors of the economy, 
along with those in agriculture, from the socially-graded classification scheme when 
reporting on the 1911 ‘fertility census’.17  
 
So, although understood in the historiography for decades as a model apparently 
demonstrating class-differential fertility across the national population, not only were two 
large sections of the population placed in intermediate ‘classes; but also three massive and 
iconic sections of the working-classes were removed entirely from the original version of the 
socially-graded professional model, placed on one side in three so-called industrial classes, 
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VI, VII and VIII. This was not a minor modification of the scheme- these three classes 
contained almost one quarter of the entire manual working-class labour force in 1911.
18
  Of 
the 465 original occupational unit groups - and of the 200 or so for which fertility information 
was published-  this left the professional model of Classes I-V representing 176 of these 
occupations. As B&G (1278) acknowledge, ‘Szreter rightly stresses that many of these 
excluded couples (Classes VI to VIII) do not fit the professional model.’ 
 
II 
 
I appreciate and agree with the aim of B&G to see the highest standards of analysis and 
testing of models applied to problems that we address in economic, social and demographic 
history. I accept that the kind of statistical evaluation performed in chapter 6 of FCG on a 
version of the Registrar-General’s model of the nation’s social classes can and should be 
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improved upon. However, I also think that, to be consistent, the highest critical standards 
should be applied to the crucial question of the theoretical formulation and the operational 
design of the model at issue. It is not enough to suppose that application of the most rigorous 
statistical techniques of evaluation also confers validity on the model that is subjected to 
those statistical tests. I therefore regard it as a most unfortunate feature of their critical 
comment that, having – rightly – held chapter 6 of FCG to task for failing to apply the 
highest standards of statistical analysis, B&G do not observe similar high standards in respect 
of the implications of the findings of chapters 2-5 of FCG, which identified previously 
ignored - but critical - problems with both the theoretical specification and the design of the 
professional model. In my view these problems are of crucial importance and should not be 
artificially separated from the statistical ANOVA exercise, nor from the substantive 
interpretation of its results. Statistical explanation does not necessarily equate to historical 
explanation, nor to historiographical significance. 
 
So, if I were to have the opportunity today of revisiting and improving the statistical analysis 
presented in chapter 6, in the light of B&G’s reasonable critical comments on the limitations 
of the statistical methods deployed there, I would also want to respect and take into account 
the fundamental problems that I uncovered in chapters 2-5 of FCG in the design of the 
professional model. This would mean, firstly, that I would want to retain the attempt made in 
chapter 6 to allow statistically for the problem of the grossly unequal sizes of the male 
occupational groups. This is primarily because the object of FCG - and the object of the 
explanatory efforts in this statistical exercise - is, ultimately, to account for the changing 
family sizes of all individual married couples in the population of England and Wales, not the 
averaged fertility of occupational groupings of such couples. Male occupation is an attribute 
of these individual married couples and it is an attribute that we are constrained to use 
13 
 
because of the form in which the published data is available.  If there are very large 
discrepancies in the numbers of married couples represented by the occupational attributes 
then we should try our best to take that into account in all forms of statistical analysis and 
representation. This is all the more important since we also know from the research presented 
in Part II of FCG, that the male occupational groupings have not been defined for 
comparability according to unified criteria but represent  a diverse collection of social units, 
the product of various heterogeneous principles and expedients devised over several decades 
at the GRO. Probably a statistical purist, faced with this knowledge about the problematic 
character and sizes of the occupations, would simply conclude that no sound statistical 
exercise could be performed, since they are non-comparable units of analysis. My own 
approach in FCG was more pragmatic and so I offered a statistical evaluation, which 
concluded that the model’s performance was far from compelling. It seems to me that the 
least we should do in any revised statistical evaluation, therefore, is to take into account the 
most salient and mathematically tractable feature of the known heterogeneity of the 
occupations, their discrepancies in size. This problem is not allowed for in any of B&G’s 
graphic representations although they do at least acknowledge at one point that it is an 
‘important’ factor. 19   
 
Secondly, I would now want to address explicitly the issue of what Stevenson did with the 
three anomalous industrial classes, rather than simply excluding them from the analysis, as I 
did in chapter 6 and as B&G have also done in their analysis.  Indeed, I was aware in FCG 
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that the exercise I conducted there was too lenient in this respect and I explicitly 
acknowledged the limitations of an analysis conducted  only on the 176 occupations of 
Classes I-V when I concluded chapter 6, by pointing out that this gave:  
  …a false impression, which exaggerates the adequacy of the professional model’s 
performance as a valid statistical summary of the whole nation’s occupational fertility 
patterns. This is especially true if the anomalous fertility behaviour of the occupations 
in the three special industrial classes, created by Stevenson for the low-fertility textile 
workers and the high-fertility miners and agricultural workers, is brought back into the 
picture, as it should be if there is to be assessment of the professional model’s overall 
validity to represent the fertility patterns of the whole nation.
 20
 [emphases added] 
.  
So, what I would now want to do, in deploying the superior statistical technique of ANOVA 
as proposed by B&G, would be to carry it out with a weighting factor for the differential sizes 
of the occupations, while also bringing back into the picture  the occupations deliberately 
excluded by Stevenson in his efforts to enhance the performance of his original model. This 
can be done, while remaining faithful to Stevenson’s own evaluations of where to distribute 
these 19 additional occupations across Classes III-V, because he subsequently in the mid-
1920s reintegrated them into the five socially graded classes. As was carefully documented in 
FCG, Stevenson revised his original 8-class model in order to achieve ‘the great merit of 
simplicity’ and so get rid of the embarrassment of the three anomalous industrial classes.21 It 
was this simplification which was certainly significant in facilitating the scheme’s 
translational appeal, international adoption and its long-term historiographical influence. In 
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the course of his official work supervising presentation of the results of the 1921 census, 
Stevenson re-allocated the component occupations of Classes VI, VII and VIII to what he 
judged to be their correct places within the 5-class scheme, thereby reducing the whole male 
working population to the tidy professional model of 5 ordinal, graded social classes. All the 
mining occupations of Class VII and most of the textiles occupations of Class VI were 
allocated by Stevenson to Class III, while the agricultural labourers of Class VIII were 
allocated to Class IV.
22
  
 
Performing such a weighted ANOVA exercise on all 195 occupations sorted into the 5 graded 
classes of the full version of the professional model results in an R
2
 value of 0.55, indicating 
that about half of the variance is statistically explained. What is the substantive significance 
and meaning of this result? To both ask and to answer such a question depends critically on 
the wider context of judgement and also on one’s prior expectations. Many statisticians, 
knowing nothing of the content of chapters 1-5 of FCG, would of course consider such an R
2 
result from a single-variable model as broadly falling into the same category as a result of 
0.67, indicating prima facie evidence of the relatively impressive explanatory power of the 5 
classes of the professional model to summarise the variance in the average fertility values of 
their constituent male occupations. But what is the historical meaning and significance that 
we should place on this R
2
 value, especially given everything else that we know from 
chapters 2-5 of FCG about the professional model’s motley inventory of underlying 
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occupational unit groups and its lack of theoretical articulation to the important concept of 
social class, which the model purports to represent?  
 
There is no doubt that the professional model, for all its faults in construction and design, 
does reflect a broadly true generalisation about the British fertility decline: that the wealthier 
sections of society in 1911 tended to restrict their fertility more than most of the poor. As 
Figure 1 confirms, the model reflects this, in that most of that minority of families headed by 
males pursuing  the range of better-paid, non-manual occupations sorted by Stevenson into 
Classes I or II  exhibit a lower fertility than most of those among the large majority placed in 
Classes III-V, whose head pursued a manual occupation. Hence the R
2
 value of 0.55. 
However, is that enough of a finding, enough of an explanation to satisfy our historical 
curiosity? Or to enable us to understand the causation involved? There is clearly also a lot of 
dispersion and diversity accompanying this general relationship; and the extent of this 
statistically ‘unexplained’ heterogeneity is also illustrated graphically in Figure 1. It shows 
both the dispersion in averaged fertility values of the 195 occupations when allocated to the 
five ranked social classes in the influential and enduring, revised version of Stevenson’s 
professional model, while also taking into account the relative sizes of each of these 
occupations as a proportion of all married males in the workforce in 1911.
 23
 Figure 1 is 
informative in showing how much quantitative overlap there was between Classes I and II; 
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and similarly how much more overlap there was between all three of the non-manual classes, 
III, IV and V.  Class III, the skilled working-class, encompasses the range of fertility values 
of both Classes IV and V. The poor performance of the professional model in relation to 
Classes III-V means that its single differentiating criterion of male occupational skill is a 
particularly poor guide to the dimensions of fertility variation among the vast majority of the 
nation’s married couples whose head pursued a manual occupation, which of course is why 
Stevenson originally had to tamper so substantially with this part of the model.   
 
{ NB NOTE to Printer: Fig. 1 to be inserted about here } 
 
It is hard to know, beyond the general confirmation it offers of the single and singularly 
unexceptional generalisation about a broad poverty-wealth gradient, what further historical 
meaning or substantive significance should be placed on this ANOVA result for the 
professional model, given the model’s theoretical incoherence and design flaws.  I continue 
to think it is therefore high time for historians of the fertility decline to emancipate 
themselves historiographically and to engage in fresh thinking beyond and outside the 
received wisdom of the professional model so as to explore alternatives, including a more 
genuine engagement with the history of class relations. That is not to say that the professional 
model’s support for the finding that there was a broad socio-economic gradient applying to 
fertility behaviour is invalid or untrue or unimportant. It is to repeat the primary 
historiographical message of FCG in pointing out that there is massive intellectual 
opportunity cost in continuing to dwell too exclusively on this single, general factor, alone, 
when Figure 1 indicates that there is so much more than this to learn about this fascinating 
historical problem.  
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III 
 
It was therefore proposed in chapters 7-10 of FCG that research should take a new theoretical 
starting point, rather than premising research on acceptance of a national-scale, socially-
graded model of a statistical event to be explained. Research should instead be informed by 
adoption of a flexible heuristic framework, which commenced with a theory of the 
perceptions and processes necessarily involved among the relevant agents – married couples, 
not occupational groups- who were restricting their marital fertility in sufficient numbers, en 
masse, to bring about the observable secular trend of sustained fall in national fertility rates. 
 
It was argued that the core of such a theory should rest on the proposition that for marital 
fertility to fall in a sustained manner this would require a significant change in perceived 
relative costs (and benefits) of childrearing.
24
 This led directly to the crucial insight that 
gender was constitutive.
25
 Gendered roles were constitutive of such perceptions of relative 
costs and benefits because gendered identities and relations were central to those doing the 
perceiving- the two married persons. This in turn led to the appreciation that not only the 
                                                          
24
 For readers wishing to consult the text of FCG to see the development of the theoretical framework presented 
in the following paragraph, see: FCG, pp.443-65; 481-503; 513-32; 546-558.  The theoretical approach has also 
been recently restated in summary form in Szreter, ‘Theories and heuristics’, where there is also reference to 
some of the most valuable recent historical and anthropological studies of changing reproductive behaviour, 
many of which have independently adopted approaches compatible with the heuristic framework advocated in 
FCG.  
25
 FCG was of course entirely indebted here to all the transforming research published on gender history, 
exemplified, for instance, in relation to modern British history by Davidoff and Hall’s, Family Fortunes; and 
Clark’s The Struggle for the Breeches. The literature is now legion. 
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moral ideologies held by these reproducing agents in the past about their gendered roles but 
also the differing labour requirements - with respect to the employment of men, women and 
children - of the economy’s diverse branches of industry mattered. They could directly 
influence differentiation of distinct norms of gendered working and parenting roles and 
related definitions of childhood and child-rearing in different communities, wherever specific 
industries were locally concentrated, as they often were in early twentieth-century Britain.
26
 
The understanding that labour markets could influence such familial norms and gendered 
roles of parenting meant that the history of the politics of industrial relations and of the civic 
communities in which industries were located could also be important influences accounting 
for the fertility differences observed among male occupations in 1911. All of this complexity 
would remain hidden and un-researched if the unitary socio-economic gradient of the 
professional model was believed to be a satisfactory summary of the nation’s occupational 
fertility patterns.  
 
The theoretical concept of communication communities was consequently proposed, defined 
as a social network of married men and women subject to a similar set of this important range 
of embedded and mutually-reinforcing institutions and influences. This could therefore 
produce a particular pattern of observable change in fertility and marriage behaviours among 
such a communication community that might be distinctive from other such communication 
communities with differently-formed gendered norms and roles. These were primarily 
communities sharing discourses, values and norms and so it followed that there could even be 
more than one such communication community living cheek by jowl in the same physical 
locality (e.g. Catholics and Protestants, though in the same locality dominated by the same 
                                                          
26
 For a superbly documented subsequent exploration of this- and its wider implications-  in three diverse 
locations in England and Wales see, Pooley ‘Parenthood and Child-rearing’.   
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industry); or that individuals could, at times experience allegiances to and participate in more 
than one such communication community. Furthermore, if they shared the same relevant 
means of significant social communication, such as the nationally-distributed newspapers, 
journals, novels and magazines read by the literate upper and middle classes in late Victorian 
Britain and sustained in their private correspondence, too, such communication communities 
might already exist before 1911 as virtual social networks spread across space, rather than 
necessarily as physically contiguous groups. 
 
FCG concluded that the complex patterns of male occupational variation in reproduction, 
(embracing both fertility and nuptiality behaviour), that emerged from examining the 
published evidence available on the 195 male occupations from the 1911 census, were 
consistent with the theory of communication communities and their differing, gendered 
constructions of familial roles, often influenced by the labour market conditions of work in 
specific, locally-dominant industries. It was acknowledged that social class was important but 
that the intrinsically gendered concept of communication communities could be a more 
productive theoretical approach to describe the social units exhibiting distinctive reproductive 
patterns. It could both explain the overall, gross pattern of difference between most non-
manual and most manual occupations – the broad ‘social class’ difference identified in a 
crude, summary fashion by the professional model of fertility decline - while also leading to 
productive explanations for the reproductive variability found within each of these two large 
categories: the  ‘middle class’ bloc of the 71 non-manual occupations mostly classified to 
Classes I and II; and the much larger (comprising 69% of the married male national 
workforce), ‘working class’ bloc of 124 manual  occupations allocated to Classes III, IV and 
V.   
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Examination in FCG of the combination of fertility and nuptiality patterns of the 71 
occupations of Classes I and II showed that they were in fact composed of at least half a 
dozen identifiably distinct communication communities, invisible to the professional model. 
For instance, although exhibiting equally very low fertility and both placed in Class I, the 
meritocratic, reformed liberal professionals (such as doctors and solicitors),  achieved their 
low fertility in combination with extremely delayed marriage, whereas the rentier and 
military officer class tended to marry their spouses at much younger ages.
27
 Similarly, among 
the 124 occupational categories engaged in manual occupations allocated to Classes III, IV 
and V, the official model’s proposed distinction in terms of skill appeared to have little 
discriminatory power. The reproductive patterns here indicated the importance, instead, of 
various labour-market induced gendered considerations, constitutive of different 
communication communities, illustrated in FCG by Figure 7.1 and Table 7.8.
28
 Not only the 
extremely high fertility of colliery districts, where men were highly-paid while women had 
almost no employment outside the home, but also, for instance, the differing opportunities for 
self-employment or spouse partnership in diverse sectors of petty retail employment. 
Furthermore, the precise conditions of gendered work in different industries mattered. For 
instance, the time-inflexible female shift-workers in south Lancashire mill towns had very 
low fertility whereas just forty miles away women workers in the Staffordshire Potteries 
continued with higher fertility, facilitated by a much more time-flexible work regime.
29
 These 
were among the industrial, labour market factors creating a diversity of several dozen 
communication communities with different reproductive regimes visualised in FCG, Figure 
7.1, from the national occupational fertility patterns in this large, manual working-class 
                                                          
27
 FCG, pp.341-46. 
28
 FCG, pp.312, 352. 
29
 FCG, pp.322-60, 488-503. 
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section of the population, once one delves beneath the large, clumsy categories of the graded 
professional model. 
 
IV 
 
B&G are concerned that FCG has had what they see as the undesirable historiographical 
influence of encouraging the view that ‘social and economic forces played little or no role in 
the [fertility] transition’ (1279). This historiographic claim is somewhat difficult to evaluate, 
since B&G cite only their own work in support of this proposition plus one book that was in 
fact published 10 years before FCG (Coale and Watkins, The Decline). FCG certainly had an 
historiographical impact, attracting 25 published reviews that I am aware of. However, most 
of these correctly understood that the book’s new approach did not stipulate that social and 
economic forces were unimportant, but only that they were not more significant than the 
cultural, ideological and political. More importantly, these reviewers also understood that 
FCG showed that it is necessary to abandon the professional model as a representation of the 
social morphology of the fertility decline, in order to be able to engage with a more complex 
approach both to social class, to gender, to agency and to causation: one which embraces the 
formative, contingent, politically-mediated relationship between the economic and the 
cultural, rather than insisting on seeing economic and cultural forms of explanation as 
mutually exclusive alternatives to each other. 
 
FCG has shown that the professional model of social classes devised by Dr Stevenson 
between 1910 and 1927 and subsequently widely adopted and historiographically far too 
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influential, was never a model of social class, which is partly at least why it was finally 
abandoned by the British census authorities at the 2001 census. B&G seem to be untroubled 
by this in continuing to describe the results of their analysis as demonstrating a strong 
relationship between fertility and social class. Indeed, their summary concludes that ‘Szreter 
argued that social class did not explain fertility differentials. We have shown to the contrary 
that it did.’ (1278).   
 
There seem to be at least two fundamental misapprehensions compounded together in this 
concluding statement by B&G, both of which FCG was attempting to deal with. Firstly, to 
reiterate, the professional model was not designed to represent any known theory of social 
class. It is not really much more than a rather imprecise and indirect, pragmatic proxy for a 
crude wealth-poverty gradient in British society. Secondly, by tying the complex concept of 
social class to the word ‘explains’ in this concluding formulation, B&G appear to be inviting 
their readers to translate the statistical meaning of ‘explanation’ (explanation of variance 
between a model’s constructed categories), which they have used throughout their text up to 
that point, into a substantively and historically meaningful usage of the term, ie the 
proposition that fertility differences in British society are satisfactorily understood as 
products of the phenomenon of social class because of the results of the reported statistical 
analysis using the professional model. The whole point of Part II of FCG was to demonstrate 
how and why this is an invalid claim. It is not possible to support this previously widely-
believed proposition from the occupational fertility evidence derived from the 1911 census in 
the form that it has been presented for generations, as the professional model. It is a difficulty 
that so much of the important twentieth-century published historical demographic and social 
evidence available to us has often been pre-sorted by officials into the classes of the 
professional model and sometimes it is necessary to work with the evidence in this form, faut 
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de mieux. However, this should be clearly understood as a necessary expedient, not as a 
satisfactory way to continue to study the influence of social class when more discriminating 
alternatives are available.      
 
What has been shown in the research I have published both in FCG and subsequently in two 
further collaborative projects, deploying both quantitative and qualitative methodologies on 
superior, individual-level data, is that social class does, indeed,  have an interesting and 
important relationship with couples’ reproductive behaviour.30 However, the professional 
model is a very limited tool for researching this. It is particularly opaque to the constitutive 
nature of gender relations, which at this time were much influenced by industrially-divergent 
labour markets. Gender is especially important for making sense of the diversity of fertility 
behaviours exhibited among married couples in their communication communities among 
both the upper, the middle and the working classes during this exciting period of dramatic 
change. The importance of integrating gender relations for understanding class and fertility 
was central to the historiographical impact and the intended historical contribution of the ten 
chapters of FCG. This could not have been more clearly signalled than by placing it in the 
title of FCG as the third term along with fertility and class, yet B&G’s critical comment, in 
focusing so exclusively on chapter 6, alone,  makes no reference at any point to gender. 
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 Garrett et al, Changing family size; Szreter and Fisher, Sex Before the Sexual Revolution.  
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Appendix. A late errata note re. Appendix G of Fertility, class and gender. 
 
This article offers an opportunity to warn readers of an oversight in the proofing or 
production of Appendix G, pp.632-33, in FCG. This error does not affect the data discussed 
above, nor any of the other figures and tables in FCG. 
 
In Chapter 9 of FCG, pp.503-13, there is a section titled ‘Fertility and Married Female 
Employment’ which offers a self-contained discussion commenting on columns of data 
tabulated in Appendix G.  Unfortunately, there is a serious and widespread set of errors in the 
tabulated data, though fortunately it is confined to Appendix G, only, and it does not affect 
the validity of anything written in the text on pp.503-13. All occupational fertility values 
cited and discussed in the text on pp.503-13 are correct. However, they do not match the 
figures listed in four of the columns of Appendix G because the latter are incorrect. These are 
Appendix G, columns 2,5,6, and 7, labelled ‘AM2/01-05, ‘Rank/AM3’, ‘AM3/01-5’, and 
‘FM25PC20’. Fortunately, columns 9 and 10 are correct (‘PC2/01-5’ and ‘PC3/01-5’).   
 
Nobody has ever contacted me about these incorrect columns of figures, which probably 
reflects the fact that I prefaced the discussion of fertility and female married employment 
among the 66 recorded female occupations with the necessary strong warnings that the data 
was likely to have been poorly recorded in the first place, that married women who worked 
for pay at this time were both a highly-selected set of working women and a selected set of 
married women, with both selective effects essentially varying and unknown- so that ‘great 
caution is called for in interpreting this data.’ (FCG, p.504)  I do not propose to supply a 
corrected series of figures for these columns, since I do not believe the data justifies any 
further secondary analysis, given the attendant interpretative difficulties. Those interested in 
the relationship between female employment and fertility are better advised to consult the 
insightful work of my colleagues, Eilidh Garrett and Alice Reid: Garrett, ‘Trials of labour’; 
Garrett and Reid, ‘Satanic mills’; Garrett et al, Changing Family Size, pp.299-313, esp Fig. 
5.8.4. 
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Figure 1 Occupational Fertility Averages weighted for occupational size in 1911 (‘Count’ = 
hundreds of thousands of married males in the occupations): 195 occupations allocated to 
the 5 socially-graded classes of the official, professional model.   
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